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Abstract
It has been estimated that 100 million plus individuals could perish if a virulent influenza pandemic were
to occur. In wake of the 2009-10 H1N1 pandemic and in an era of economic austerity, however, industry
lacks clear incentives to invest in vaccines for other high-risk strains. The cyclic nature of pandemics also
means we can expect another influenza pandemic within the next 20 years. In this environment, design
of incentive mechanisms for funding development of vaccines against strains with known pandemic
potential, but for whom vaccine technology is currently lacking, would be welcomed. This research
explores which novel incentive mechanisms could induce investment in and development of processes
for production of vaccines for these high risk strains. Interviews with vaccine developers and funding
agencies and analysis of the pipeline of influenza vaccines in development were conducted.
This thesis finds that there is a dearth of vaccines against influenza strains of known pandemic potential,
such as H2, H7 and H9; that current pandemic preparedness efforts are not focused on these strains;
that funding for pandemic preparedness efforts in H2, H7 and H9 would help incentivize development of
vaccines against these strains; and that support for seasonal influenza, regulatory changes, alignment of
public and private sector goals, and increased vaccine acceptance are also required to incentivize the
development of vaccines against strains of known pandemic potential such as H2, H7 and H9.
Furthermore, this thesis recommends that policy makers increase funding for pandemic preparedness so
that programs may be initiated or expanded to include additional high risk influenza strains; that US and
EU regulatory regimes for pandemic influenza vaccines be harmonized; and that governments promote
public awareness of the importance of influenza vaccination.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The idea for this thesis arose during a business school summer internship at Novartis Vaccines and
Diagnostics in the pandemic influenza group. My two primary objectives for the summer were to draw
lessons from the 2009-10 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and to help launch a pre-pandemic vaccine in
Europe for the H5N1 influenza strain. As I learned more about these topics and influenza in general over
the summer, I noticed something troubling: vaccines against certain strains of influenza with known
pandemic potential (H2, H7 and H9) were not in the portfolio of Novartis or other major vaccine
developers such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). Moreover, based on European government disinterest in the
H5 pre-pandemic vaccine, the market potential for such vaccines seemed limited to nonexistent.
This is surprising and troubling. Following the 2009-10 HiN1 pandemic, the World Health Organization
(WHO)'s chairwoman, Margaret Chan, was widely quoted acknowledging that the world dodged a bullet
and was lucky to have experience such a mild influenza pandemic: "This time around, we have been
aided by pure good luck. The virus did not mutate during the pandemic to a more lethal form.
Widespread resistance to oseltamivir [an antiviral] did not develop. The vaccine proved to be a good
match with circulating viruses and showed an excellent safety profile (WHO 2012)."a
Next time the world may not be so lucky. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation estimates that 100
million plus individuals could perish in an influenza pandemic, with those most at risk in the developing
world (PATH 2007). Even much more conservative estimates would be devastating in term of: deaths,
life years lost (since the young are often most vulnerable to new circulating strains of influenza) (Viboud,
et al. 2010) and economic losses in the form of disruption of trade, transportation, etc.
aWhile antivirals are used in instances of pandemic influenza, vaccination is considered the preferred method for
disease control.
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The case for concern about these strains is very real. For example, in the Netherlands in 2003, there was
an outbreak of H7N7 outbreak that resulted in a 1/89 mortality rate. Along with H7, the WHO deems H2
and H9 strains of influenza with pandemic potential:
Figure 1: The Case for Concern (Author's analysis) (Barry 2004) (Yong 2012) (WHO n.d.)
Ha H7 He
e H2N2 caused the 1957
pandemic
* Proven ability to pass from
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majority of today's population
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* 1/89 mortality case
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mortality rate:
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- 44-115mllion sick
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birds worldwide
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Influenza A H1N1, H3N2, and influenza B; currently there are also candidate vaccine
viruses and potency testing reagents for a variant of H3N2
Given the unfavorable environment to invest in vaccines against these strains, the question of how to
design incentive mechanisms to encourage development is an important one.
The motivating question of this thesis is: What novel sets of incentives can induce investment in and
development of processes for production of H2, H7 and H9 influenza vaccines?
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Answering this question could benefit numerous stakeholders, including the public health community,
vaccine developers, governments, their citizens, physicians, scientists working in influenza and
economist interested in incentive mechanism design.
The ultimate goal in pandemic influenza vaccine preparedness is a universal vaccine. These are vaccines
that can target multiple strains of pandemic influenza and could provide broad protection. Current
universal vaccines in development are years away and some scientists even view their development as
impossible. Until they are, strain-matched vaccines against neglected, high risk strains are urgently
needed.
9
Chapter 2: Background
Pandemic influenza
There are two strains of pandemic influenza that are well known to the general public: there is H5N1,
which received widespread attention following outbreaks in 1997 and 2003, and has garnered renewed
attention in recent months as researchers have sought to publish the mechanism involved in human to
human transmission (Saey 2012) (An Engineered Doomsday 2012); and there is H1N1, which spread
rapidly across the globe in 2009-10.
As mentioned earlier, other strains of influenza are also considered to be of pandemic potential. The
WHO has three criteria that are used to make a determination that a form of influenza is a pandemic
(WHO 2006):
1) "a new virus emerges with a new [haemagglutinin antigen (HA) on the influenza virus] to which
there is almost universal susceptibility;
2) this virus is capable of causing significant disease in humans;
3) this virus is efficiently transmitted from human to human."
Viruses that newly emerge thus are of concern according to this criterion; such viruses that cause
morbidity and/or mortality in humans are of even greater concern; and those that also are able to make
the leap from animal to human transmission to human to human transmission are considered pandemic
viruses.
Such viruses become possible according to the WHO (WHO 2006), when there is an antigenic shift in the
[HA] of an influenza virus to a new type - a type to which virtually the entire human population lacks
immunity. "
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The exact time when a given strain of influenza might emerge in pandemic form is unknown. Experts
agree that there is a cyclic nature to influenza pandemics but are divided on the predicted length of time
between pandemics. Historical trends, as illustrated below, lead many to believe that an influenza
pandemic is likely every 20-50 years.
Figure 2: Timeline of Human Flu Pandemics (Author's analysis) (Clyde Crumpacker 2011)
(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services n.d.)
Year Strain Mortaity Additional impact
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1898-00 Old Hong Kong
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H1N1 e 675,000 US became ill
a illness andmortality rates were highest among
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= H1N1 continuedto circulate, causing epiderrics
from 1927-43
1957-58 Asian influenza * 69,800 US a Eldedyhadthe highestrates of death
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Moreover, new strains continue to emerge in humans.
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Figure 3: Appearance of New Influenza Strains in Humans (Author's analysis)
(Clyde Crumpacker 2011) (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services n.d.)
Year Strain kupact
1976 HswN1 e Four soldiers in a US army base in NewiJersey are infectedwith swineinfluerra, resulting in one death.
e Concerms that the virus was similarto the 1918 Spanishflu were unfounded
1977 Russian a This virus was sirnilarto thevirus that spread before 1957, andindivduas bom before 1957 were
Influenza generally protected. However, children and young aduts bom after that year were not because they had
HIN1 no prior immunity.
a Not considereda pandenic because most patientswere children.
1997,2003- H5N1 e The firsttime an influenza virus was foundto be transnitted direcyfrom birds to people, with infections
linkedto exposure to poultry markets.
a To datethere are 606 laboratory confirmed casesfrom patierts in: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia,
China, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, IraqLaos, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam
@ Of thesethere 357 patientshave died(59%)
1999,2003 H9N2 - Appeared forthe irsttime in humans in 1999, causing illness in two children in Hong Kong, with poultry
beingthe probable source. In 2003, caused illness in one child in Hong Kong
2002,2003 H7N2 e In 2002, evidence ofinfecionisfoundin one person in Virginiafollowing a poultryoutbreak. In2003,
caused a personto be hospitaizedin NewYork.
2003,2007 H7N7 e The first reported casesofthis strain in humanswere in 2003, when 89 people in the Netherlands, most
of whom were poultryworkers, became ill with eye infections orflu-Iike symptorra A veterinarian who
visited one ofthe affected poultry farms died.
a In May 2007,four cases ofH7N7 avianinfluenza were conirmed inthe United Kingdom among
individuals exposedto infected poultry.
2004 H7N3 a In 2004, infection is reportedforthe lrsttime in humans aftertwo poultryworkers In Canada fall ill.
2004 H1ON7 e In 2004, infection is reportedforthe trsItime in humans aftertwo Infants in Egyptfall Ill. One child's
fatheris a Doultymerchant.
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Incentives for neglected diseases
Neglected diseases are ones for which drugs, vaccines and diagnostics are needed but the economic
incentives for companies to develop these technologies are lacking. Traditionally, incentives to create
these technologies have focused on diseases afflicting primarily patients in the developing world, such
as HIV, malaria, pneumonia and diarrheal disease.
By creating "push" mechanisms that reduce the risks and costs of technology developers, or "pull"
mechanisms that increase the technology developer's return on investment, incentives for neglected
diseases create an economic environment in which desired technologies can be developed that
otherwise would not.
With the advent of the Gates Foundation and the help of donor governments and other foundations, a
plethora of types of incentives for neglected diseases have arisen. (Please see Figure 4 below for a
schematic of types of incentives for neglected diseases.)
Push mechanisms in general focus on the pre-clinical and clinical phases of the research and
development process. These can be funded directly by governments, global health funds (which are
funded by donor governments; examples include the GAVI Alliance) or innovation funds (these include
the Gates-supported International AIDS Vaccine Initiative Innovation Fund). Governments have offered
expedited regulatory review of the technology in development and grant funding to pharmaceutical
(pharma) and biotechnology (biotech) companies. Global health funds have offered grants and low
interest loans to pharma companies and developing country researchers. Innovations funds have also
offered grants to pharma and biotech companies.
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Other types of push mechanisms include tax credits for R&D; product development partnerships;
facilitation mechanisms; and liability protection.
Pull mechanisms increase the rewards for successful R&D investments and are rewarded to products
that are fully developed and/or marketed. These have been funded directly by governments and
foundations as Gates. Governments have offered a credit for expedited regulatory review of a different
technology in development (i.e. FDA priority review vouchers); price guarantees; and one time cash
awards (prizes) for pharma and biotech companies. The Gates Foundation and other organizations have
also participated in offering prizes to pharma and biotech companies, and Gates has been instrumental
in funding the advance market commitment to support prices for neglected disease technologies.
Other types of pull mechanisms include purchase funds; improved market information; tax credits on
sales; intellectual property incentives; and patent buyouts.
Figure 4: Types of Incentives for Neglected Diseases (Author's analysis) (Hecht 2009)
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Current incentives for pandemic influenza vaccines: Introduction
Pandemic influenza represents another type of disease neglected by for-profit vaccine developers. Given
the need for protection against pandemic influenza, the US government has stepped in with multiple
programs to incent desired activity. These programs are laid out in Table 1 and described in detail
below.
Table 1: Current Incentives for Pandemic Influenza Vaccines
Fudn Progra Type of Inlunz Sae of Teho.g
BARDA Cell-based influenza vaccine Push Not strain Clinical Cell-based
development specific
BARDA Year round egg supply
guarantee for influenza
vaccine manufacturing
Push Not strain
specific
Clinical Egg-based
BARDA Pre-pandemic vaccine Pull H5 Developed Egg-based
stockpiles
BARDA Antigen-sparing technology Push Not strain Clinical Adjuvant
development specific
BARDA Retrofitting to enhance Push Not strain Clinical Egg-based
manufacturing capacity specific
BARDA Cell-based facility Push Not strain Clinical Cell-based
construction specific
BARDA Recombinant vaccines Push Not strain Clinical Next generation
development specific technology
BARDA Next generation assay Push Not strain Clinical Next generation
development specific technology
DARPA Quick plant-based Push H1 Clinical Next generation
manufacturing proof of technology
concept
DARPA Large scale plant-based Push H1 Clinical Next generation
manufacturing technology
DARPA In vitro assessment of Push Not strain Clinical Next generation
immune responses specific technology
DARPA Extending the value of the Push Not strain Clinical Adjuvant
antigen specific
NIAID Research Push Not strain Pre-clinical Multiple
specific
PATH Supporting development of Push HI, H2, H5, H7 Pre- Next generation
live attenuated influenza clinical/clinical technology
15
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vaccines (LIAV)
PATH Developing recombinant Push Not strain Pre-clinical Next generation
influenza vaccines specific technology
PATH Developing vaccines with Push Not strain Pre- Adjuvant
non-propriety adjuvants specific clinical/clinical
PATH Broadly reactive (universal) Push Not strain Pre-clinical Next generation
vaccines specific technology
Current incentives for pandemic influenza vaccines: BARDA
The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority's (BARDA's) efforts are focused on products that are in the clinical phases of
development or in some cases are already marketed. The HHS entity views itself as an advanced
development organization. Companies at earlier stages of development are directed to the NIAID to
develop the technology. Most of the work is done by contract, with multiple contracts granted for most
programs.
BARDA's main pandemic preparedness programs include:
1) Cell-based influenza vaccine development. In 2005-06, six contracts were awarded to Sanofi
Pasteur, MedImmune, GSK, Solvay, DynPort Vaccine Company LLC (DVC)/Baxter and Novartis to
develop influenza vaccines manufactured using cell culture technology. Three of these programs
remain active today: DVC/Baxter, GSK and Novartis. Developing manufacturing capabilities in
cell culture is a BARDA priority since the traditional method of manufacturing influenza vaccines
is egg-based, and the egg supply could become endangered in the event of an avian influenza
outbreak.
2) Year round egg supply guarantee for influenza vaccine manufacturing. In that same vein, in
2005 BARDA launched a program to ensure that egg-producing flocks birds of would be available
year-round to supply influenza vaccine manufacturers in the event of a pandemic. Traditionally,
influenza vaccine manufacturers procure eggs only for the window of the year when they are
producing seasonal influenza vaccine. Were a pandemic to emerge, sufficient eggs supplies to
produce vaccine would also need to be available.
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3) Pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles. In 2005, BARDA initiated the first contracts to produce H5
vaccine for stockpiles. This program was originally with Sanofi Pasteur and has been expanded
to include contracts with Novartis and GSK for procurement of both antigen as well as adjuvant
for the stockpiles. BARDA is stockpiling with the goal of having enough vaccine for 20 million
people in the critical workforce, should there be an influenza pandemic, and currently has
enough vaccine to do that for a multiple high risk strain of H5.
4) Antigen-sparing technology development. This program has awarded contracts to InterCell,
GSK and Novartis, with the GSK and Novartis programs remaining active. The goal is to expand
the supply of pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines available at onset and during an
influenza pandemic by optimization of antigen content using available adjuvants. GSK filed for a
Biologics License Application for US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of their
adjuvants with pandemic vaccines in February of this year.
5) Retrofitting to enhance manufacturing capacity. This program awarded contracts to
Medimmune and Sanofi to retrofit existing facilities in the US to enhance their influenza vaccine
manufacturing capacity. In the case of MedImmune, there is sufficient production of its live
attenuated vaccine and the BARDA contracts seeks to overcome the rate limiting step of filling
the vaccine. In the case of Sanofi, BARDA is helping to double the influenza vaccine
manufacturing capacity by building a new facility.
6) Cell-based facility construction. This program's largest single award is to Novartis, to support
the building of a domestic US facility that can produce 150 million doses of cell-based influenza
vaccine within six months of a pandemic declaration.
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7) Recombinant vaccines development. BARDA has also awarded contracts to support the
development of recombinant influenza vaccines at Protein Sciences, Novavax and VaxInnate.
The next-generation technology platforms these companies are developing could produce
influenza vaccine faster and possibly with higher efficacy than existing egg- and cell-based
manufacturing methods.
8) Next generation assay development. BARDA is also sponsoring efforts to develop next-
generation assays for influenza manufacturing with the goal of reducing manufacturing time for
pandemic influenza vaccines by 1-2 weeks. In particular, there is interest in reducing the time
associated with the Single Radial Immunodiffusion (SRID) assay, which determines the specific
antigen concentration in the vaccine, and the sterility assay, which tests for vaccine sterility.
Current incentives for pandemic influenza vaccines: DARPA
The US Department of Defense (DOD) Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA's) efforts are
focused on developing basic platform technologies and working on problems of importance to national
defense that are hard and high risk and therefore unattractive to industry, but if solved could beget both
defense and commercial applications.
DARPA's main pandemic preparedness programs, all under the aegis of Blue Angel, are focused on
development of a recombinant DNA plant-based expression platform. Influenza is a proof of concept for
this platform, which DARPA is also considering for manufacture of a recombinant nerve agent,
monoclonal antibodies, and other products that could demonstrate the versatility of the platform.
19
These programs include:
1) Quick plant-based manufacturing proof of concept. DARPA awarded contracts to four
companies with plant-based manufacturing platforms: Fraunhofer USA Center for Molecular
Biotechnology in Delaware, Kentucky Bioprocessing in Owensboro, a consortium called Project
GreenVax, whose partners are the Texas A&M University system and a Texas company called G-
Con, and Medicago USA in North Carolina (Pellerin 2012), and asked them to demonstrate that
they can manufacture an H1 protein.
2) Large scale plant-based manufacturing. All of these companies then advanced to demonstrate
their large scale manufacturing capabilities at scale and under GMP. Companies are tasked with
producing 1 kilogram of antigen in 30 days, or 10 million doses in one month of recombinant
protein.
3) in vitro assessment of immune responses. DARPA contracted with VaxDesign (now a subsidiary
of Sanofi) in Florida to develop a cell-based antibody readout system that determines if an
antigen will be immunogenic in humans. The goal of the program is to help select lead
candidates for clinical trials and reduce unnecessary development expenses.
4) Extending the value of the antigen. Like BARDA, DARPA is also interested in exploring the use of
adjuvant technologies. DARPA has contracted with the Infectious Disease Research Institute
(IDRI) in Seattle to use its GLA adjuvant, which has a mechanism of action similar to others the
FDA has approved.
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Current incentives for pandemic influenza vaccines: NIAID
According to the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID), developing new and improved vaccines is a high priority. The NIAID influenza vaccine
program supports research activities in the following areas (NIAID 2012):
" Innovative technologies to improve production flexibility
* New, more broadly protective vaccines
* Vaccines effective against newly emerging influenza viruses
* Adjuvant development, from early discovery to clinical evaluation
* Safety and efficacy in special populations
Current incentives for pandemic influenza vaccines: PATH
The Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) sees itself as complementing what pharma
companies and governments may do to combat pandemic influenza, and vaccine development is a
relatively new part of PATH's portfolio. Funding for PATH's operations is provided primarily by the Gates
Foundation. One exception is a rare international program funded by BARDA, whereby PATH is helping a
vaccine manufacturer in Vietnam produce a pandemic vaccine.
PATH's main influenza vaccine project (IVP) has four components:
1) Supporting development of live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV). PATH is partnering with
Russia's Institute of Experimental Medicine (IEM) to develop LAIVs, similar in technology to
MedImmune's FluMist, for avian influenza viruses. LAIVs hold the potential to be produced
inexpensively, quickly, and in large quantities, which could lead to a more efficient response in
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both pandemic and seasonal outbreaks, and generally delivered through droppers or nasal spray
devices, which can reduce reliance on needles and enable non-medical personnel to administer
the vaccine in a global outbreak.
PATH has supported IEM's efforts to develop an H7N3 vaccine, which is now in phase I clinical
trials in Russia, and funds identification of seed strains for other viruses of pandemic potential,
including H1N1 (developed in 2009), H5N1 (three candidates completed preclinical testing, one
phase I trial is ongoing and there are plans for a potential second trial), and H2N2 (preclinical
development in progress). (Kathleen M. Neuzil 2012)
All LAIVs developed under this partnership agreement can be sublicensed by the WHO to
companies in developing countries.
2) Developing recombinant influenza vaccines. Like BARDA and DARPA, PATH is also interested in
developing recombinant influenza vaccines. PATH's contract is with Gaithersburg, Maryland-
based Lentigen and is currently at the preclinical stage of testing for avian influenza subtypes.
PATH believes that unique advantages to this approach could include high production yields of
VLPs in a portable and disposable manufacturing system, which could lead to heightened real-
time response capacity in a pandemic. (PATH, Influenza vaccine development n.d.)
3) Developing vaccines with non-propriety adjuvants. As like BARDA and DARPA, PATH has
recognized that adjuvants will likely be a requirement to achieve sufficient pandemic influenza
vaccine immunogenicity in people who are immunologically naive to the circulating strain. As
such, PATH is collaborating with Seattle's IDRI (which is also working with DARPA on a separate
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initiative) to develop adjuvants that are not proprietary and can be licensed broadly by
companies in the developing world. A second phase of this collaboration will involve studies of
developed adjuvants with vaccine candidates to identify leading vaccine-adjuvant candidates
(Infectious Disease Research Institute 2010).
4) Broadly reactive (universal) vaccines. For this initiative, PATH is partnering with Medicago to
use its plant-based virus-like particle (VLP) manufacturing platform to produce antigen based on
research from the University of Pittsburgh, which has a computational approach to design
broadly reactive hemagluttinin (HA) antigen on the surface of VLPs. The Pittsburgh approach
modifies a sequence of HA to create a synthetic molecule that can then be recognized and
create the immunity against all previous historic strains of influenza, and perhaps create
immunity against emerging strains as well. (PATH, Agreements signed to advance research for
broad-coverage influenza vaccines 2010)
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Chapter 3: Research design
Hypotheses and key questions
The apparent dearth of vaccines in development for known strains of pandemic potential is extremely
concerning. This thesis seeks to understand what incentives would effectively encourage the private
sector to invest greater resources in developing vaccines for these strains. Specifically, this thesis aims to
answer three sets of questions:
1) What are the corporate goals of influenza companies? What are the goals of government
agencies that work together with these companies on pandemic influenza programs?
2) What is the decision-making process for initiation of influenza vaccine programs within for-profit
companies, particularly for strains of pandemic potential? What is the role of any outside
incentives or partnerships in vaccine development?
3) What incentive mechanisms, financial or otherwise, could induce additional private investment
in vaccines for strains of pandemic potential? (see Figure 4: Types of Incentives for Neglected
Diseases)
This thesis sought to test six hypotheses related to the above questions. These hypotheses are:
1) There is a dearth of vaccines against known influenza strains of pandemic potential H2, H7 and
H9
2) Funding agencies for pandemic influenza have not focused efforts on H2, H7 and/or H9
3) For-profit vaccine developers require an economic rationale to develop and commercialize a
vaccine
4) Developing vaccines against H2, H7 and /or H9 is not a profoundly difficult scientific problem
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5) Developing vaccines against H2, H7 and /or H9 is uneconomic for for-profit vaccine developers
under current conditions
6) New financial incentive mechanisms will induce investment in and development of H2, H7 and
H9 influenza vaccines
Methods
To answer these questions and test these hypotheses, I first performed a descriptive analysis of the ADIS
R&D Insight drug pipeline database (ADIS R&D Insight 2012) to quantify and characterize the extent of
influenza vaccine development. I then conducted primary qualitative research with key stakeholders in
pandemic influenza, using the ADIS database to identify target interviewees. Two sets of companies
were characterized:
1) Those with programs in H2, H7, and/or H9.
2) Those with programs for other strains of influenza. This group was sorted and prioritized
according to the number of programs ongoing.
I initially deemed only the latter group "at risk" because companies in that group could choose to pursue
vaccine development for high risk strains under the right conditions. However, I later realized that all
companies in my sample were "at risk," since none were working on vaccines for all strains of known
pandemic potential.
In addition, I noted that many of these companies had significant operations in the US and had received
funding from outside entities. US government agencies and non-profits providing significant funding in
influenza were then also added to the target list:
* US Department of Health and Human Services Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority (BARDA)
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* US Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
* US National Institutes of Health National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)
* Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH)
Furthermore, in an attempt to capture broad industry insights, I sought to speak with known influenza
industry experts.
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The target list for interviews was as follows:
Table 2: Target Company Interview List
Company Type Recent influenza Neglected high Other pandemnic
vaccine company risk strains influenza strains
acquisitions
Sanofi Pasteur Pharma Acambis H7 H1, H5
Novartis Pharma H9 H1, H5
Baxter Pharma H9 H1, H5
GlaxoSmithKline Pharma ID Biomedical H2 H1, H5
(GSK) Corporation
Crucell (a Johnson Biotech Berna Biotech H7, H9 H1, H5
& Johnson
subsidiary)
Abbott Pharma Solvay N/A H5
CSL Pharma N/A H1, H5
Merck Pharma N/A N/A
AlphaVax Biotech N/A H1, H5
Medicago Biotech N/A H1, H5
MedImmune (a Biotech N/A H1, H5
subsidiary of
AstraZeneca)
Novavax Biotech N/A H1, H5
PowderMed (a Biotech N/A H5
subsidiary of
Pfizer)
Protein Sciences Biotech N/A H1, H5
Corporation
Serum Institute of Biotech N/A H1, H5
India
Sinovac Biotech Biotech N/A H1, H5
Vaxart Biotech N/A H1, H5
Vaxine Biotech N/A H1
Vaxinnate Biotech N/A H1,H5
Visterra Biotech N/A H1,H5
Interviews were conducted primarily over the phone (with selected interviews were in person), with all
but a few conducted between March and May 2012. The duration was typically 45 minutes to one hour.
Interviews were scheduled through personal introductions and Linkedin expertise requests.
Interviewees included individuals from senior management, program management, regulatory affairs,
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marketing, business development, and other functions. Some answers to questions were prompted, and
some were unprompted.
In total, I conducted 20 interviews with current or recent former employees of the following 18
organizations:
Figure 5: Interviewees
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Chapter 4: Results
Hypothesis 1: There is a dearth of vaccines against known influenza strains of
pandemic potential H2, H7 and H9
Influenza vaccines in development
I found that clinical development in influenza strains H2, H7 and H9 is currently lacking. Of the 119
influenza vaccines in preclinical or clinical development, only three target strains of H2, H7, or H9. In
contrast, there are 25 projects for H1 and 30 projects for H5 at the same stages of development. In
addition, among vaccines that are registered or marketed, the sole H2, H7 or H9 vaccine is an H9
mockup registered in Europe by Novartis following co-development with the NIAID. In contrast, there
are 13 vaccines marketed or registered for H1 and ten for H5 in the US.
Figure 6 below provides an overview of influenza vaccines in development. This clearly demonstrates
that, relative to other strains of pandemic potential HI and H5, the strains H2, H7 and H9 are not a focus
of vaccine development. This provides strong evidence to support my first hypothesis that there is a
dearth of vaccines against known influenza strains of pandemic potential H2, H7 and H9.
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Figure 6: Influenza Vaccines in Development (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D Insight 2012)
Precmical PhasMl PhmI pbauem 111119111"
H2 SKF 106160 -
GlaxoSmilhKnne
H7 inluenza influenza H7Ni influenza
monoclonal monoclonal virus A vaccine-
antibodies- anhibodes- sanon
Kirin Phara c pasteureFLUPAN
H9 infuenzavirus inluenzaA virus Pandemicinluerma
H9N2vaccine - vaccine H9N2- A virus vaccines -
Crucehi Baxter NovarbsJMlAID
H1 2 11 10 4 0 13
HS4
All other
14 13
40
3
6
0
2
10
15
Hypothesis 2:
efforts on H2,
Funding agencies for pandemic influenza have not focused
H7 and/or H9
Funding agency goals
The goals of funding agencies tend to be specific and clearly elucidated. Selected goals are listed below.
BARDA:
1) Establish and maintain dynamic pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpiles available for 20
million people (two doses per person). So far, this program is limited to H5N1.
2) Provide pandemic vaccine to all US citizens within 6 months of a pandemic declaration (600
million doses, assuming two doses per person and 300 million US citizens), with the first doses
available by week 12 of the pandemic.
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DARPA: DARPA's pandemic influenza efforts were initiated in 2009 and are known as the Blue Angel
program. Vaccine-related goals for Blue Angel are to develop a surge capacity, and include:
1) Identifying new ways to produce large amounts of high-quality vaccine-grade protein in less
than two months in response to emerging and novel biologic threats, including pandemic
influenza.
2) Developing a Modular IMmune In vitro Constructs (MIMIC) system to test vaccine produced
using plant-based manufacturing methods to ensure it is safe and immunogenic.
To ensure successful contract completion, DARPA also tells awardees that the long term goal of projects
is an FDA-approved product. This is driven by a belief that companies with commercially viable products
are more stable partners for the Department of Defense in the long run. Thus, DARPA seeks to fund
companies with dual use for their technologies-both a biodefense purpose that DARPA can fund (i.e.
pandemic influenza) and another purpose that a commercial market can support (i.e. seasonal
influenza).
PATH: PATH's stated goal is to advance the development of promising new vaccine technologies that the
global population, including people in low-resource countries, can access and afford in influenza
outbreaks.
Funding agency decision-making
BARDA: BARDA relies heavily on colleagues at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to do surveillance
on the viruses in circulation. Depending on the perceived threat of a circulating strain (i.e. how many
cases there are in humans, severity of illness, rate of person-to-person transmission), BARDA then
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consults with agencies from across the US government, including the FDA, CDC, NIH, DOD and HHS to
determine the next best course of action.
Requests for proposals or task orders would then be issued in a stepwise approach:
1) Determine whether a vaccine candidate for the strain of concerns exists. If so, this is given to a
vaccine manufacturer. If not, one is developed.
2) Production of a batch of vaccine candidate antigens to determine compatibility with the
manufacturing platform.
3) Production of reagents to determine the antigen yield, the amount of antigen the
manufacturing platform is able to produce.
4) Clinical trials to determine immunogenicity (provoked immune response) of the antigen in
various age groups and dosing regimens, and to determine whether addition of an adjuvant is
warranted.
5) Full scale manufacture.
DARPA: DARPA chose to focus on influenza for two reasons:
1) It became a target of opportunity in the wake of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and was fundable
(Blue Angel began in May 2009 when the pandemic was in full force).
2) With influenza, unlike other biodefense and countermeasures threats, it is possible to conduct
human clinical studies. This allows DARPA to understand if a technology platform works, and if it
does, the technology or platform is deemed less risky and can become viable for industry to
further develop.
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Given the timing and reasoning for the launch of Blue Angel, H1 was a logical choice among influenza
strains to demonstrate that the technology platforms could produce proteins in the necessary time
frame.
PATH: PATH believes in the importance of identifying seed strains and candidate vaccines for pandemic
viruses, noting that, with influenza, no one really knows which strain will cause a pandemic. PATH
believes in creating several potential vaccine candidates, testing them for safety at minimum, and
keeping them in reserve, so if a particular strain does start a pandemic, there is a quicker way to develop
vaccine. Accordingly, PATH has pursed development of H7N3 and H2N2 candidate vaccines. PATH works
closely with the WHO and uses the WHO surveillance network to identify strains of concern.
We see from a review of key funding agencies that H2, H7 and H9 are not an area of specific emphasis.
Their programs, as laid out in Table 1, also demonstrate that the H2, H7 and H9 strains are not the
targets of current programs. In addition, we see from funding agency decision-making processes that,
with the exception of PATH, there is not a clean path to funding a vaccine for a high-risk strain prior to
escalated pandemic potential. This supports my second hypothesis that funding agencies for pandemic
influenza have not focused efforts on H2, H7 and/or H9.
Hypothesis 3: For-profit vaccine developers require an economic rationale to
develop and commercialize a vaccine
Vaccine developer goals
The goals of pandemic influenza manufacturers are typically two-fold:
* Return on investment
* Broader corporate citizenship
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According to one company executive, "The business case for a pandemic vaccine has always been a
difficult one. A company has to put a lot of effort, resources and money into a product that may never
be marketed. There has always been a lot of discussion around it. The other side of the coin is the
corporate citizenship and social responsibility. Companies have an obligation to prepare the world for a
pandemic, such as the one that occurred in 1918. But it's always a balance between that and a
reasonable business model."
The relative prioritization of these two attributes varies by company. Some interviewees suggested that
influenza vaccine manufacturers may not seek to profit off of vaccine development for pandemic
influenza to support the public good, though these companies would not want to lose money either.
However, interviewees associated with venture-backed companies indicated a need to create a return
on investment for shareholders, but argued that creating value for patients and governments by
producing safe and efficacious vaccines is a means to that end.
Representatives from companies that are not active in developing pandemic influenza technologies
cited the inability to achieve a sufficient return on investment as the reason. This is due to:
* Need for further investments to achieve uncertain revenues
* inability to differentiate technology and to capture a price premium
These interviewees considered the market for seasonal influenza vaccines to be crowded and
commoditized, and cited these reasons for their companies' decisions not to participate. Because they
do not have facilities and manpower available from their seasonal programs, these companies have
significantly higher costs (personnel, manufacturing technology, etc.) associated with entering pandemic
influenza, and also choose not to participate there.
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Vaccine developer decision-making
Companies' decisions to initiate programs are aligned with their corporate citizenship and return on
investment goals.
* Many companies take initiative in beginning work with new seed strains. When there is a
potential pandemic strain identified by the WHO or CDC, a company might start experimenting
with it without waiting for a specific government request. Company representatives in general
did not want to discuss their criteria for deciding when to initiate work with given seed strains,
viewing it as trade secrets.
* In the absence of government involvement, vaccine candidates will not advance. Some
company representatives lamented that they could do more in terms of producing theoretical
pandemic strains. Though these manufacturers do work on theoretical strains, funds devoted to
such work divert resources from programs with clearer revenue potential. Again, the point at
which a developer might stop working with a seed strain in the absence of a specific
government request was viewed as a trade secret by interviewees.
* Decision to initiate a vaccine program against a strain of concern is driven by a specific
government request. A request from BARDA, however, would significantly improve the chances
of advancing a vaccine candidate. This request is in effect a hybrid "pull" mechanism that
reduces the market risks associated with pandemic influenza vaccine development, as the
developers know that the US government is interested in purchase of such a vaccine.
Most interviewees described similar rationales for their companies' business decision-making:
There are roughly four pandemics per century, which amounts to about one every 25 years. All
companies are looking for a viable business opportunity in a shorter time frame. They do not
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know which strain form the pandemic may take, or if a competitor vaccine will emerge in the
interim before the pandemic arises. In that environment, who is going to invest a lot of money
in developing a vaccine for a pandemic that may never happen in our lifetime? Unless there is a
worried government with funding, they likely will not.
Companies do believe there are benefits in working with pandemic candidate strains prior to a
pandemic. These include:
* Developing comfort with compatibility of strains to manufacturing platforms. This includes both
the ability to produce the antigen as well as the antigen yield.
* Developing understanding of the possible dosing required for an immunogenic vaccine.
Particularly if a strain has not circulated in the population for a while, a large dose, an
adjuvanted dose (antigen plus an adjuvant that that enhances the body's immune response to
the antigen), and/or two doses may be required to achieve an immune response
* Providing an opportunity to study different adjuvant approaches
* Providing an opportunity to do an efficacy study in the event of a pandemic. Seasonal influenza
vaccine clinical trials are expensive to run because of the large numbers of patients needed to
show efficacy. At time of a pandemic, fewer patients are needed for such a clinical trial. So, a
company that has advanced a candidate far enough along to run a clinical trial with it in a
pandemic setting will have a dataset it can take away and use to support the efficacy of its
platform technology.
Employees of vaccine developers note that most pandemic influenza programs are focused on H1N1 and
H5N1, the two highest profile strains in recent years. The following reasons are cited for this focus:
e H1N1's speed of spread in 2009-10
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. H5N1's continued circulation and high mortality rate when it crosses over into humans
Other strains of pandemic potential have not garnered the same level of attention from BARDA, DARPA,
NIAID and PATH and thus have not generated significant attention among vaccine developers. This is
directly reflected in the paucity of programs for strains of H2, H7 and H9. I found that vaccine
developers require a return on investment to advance a clinical program, and that without a specific
government request establishing a market for a developed vaccine, vaccine candidates will languish.
This clearly supports my third hypothesis that for-profit vaccine developers require an economic
rationale to develop and commercialize a vaccine.
Hypothesis 4: Developing vaccines against H2, H7 and /or H9 is not a
profoundly difficult scientific problem
One possible explanation for the lack of vaccines against H2, H7 and H9 is that developing such vaccines
poses a great technical challenge to vaccine developers. Interviewees report that influenza vaccine
developers use their manufacturing technologies as platforms for producing seasonal and pandemic
vaccines. These platforms are capable of producing various strains of pandemic potential. Moreover, it is
not uncommon for vaccine developers to test this capability to see if various influenza strains can be
incubated in a firm's manufacturing platform (such as eggs), and whether a reasonable yield of antigen
can be obtained.
Given the absence of evidence to the contrary, interviewees confirmed that producing vaccine against
other strains is not significantly more difficult than producing vaccine against seasonal strains, H5N1 or
HINI.
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Another possibility is that this is a futile effort for companies. Current and even next-generation
influenza vaccine technologies require a specific seed strain to be identified before vaccine production
can commence. Thus, in the absence of WHO/CDC efforts to identify seed strains and associated
reagents, development of a candidate vaccine cannot commence.
Neither of these points suggests that development of pandemic influenza vaccines is impeded by a gap
in scientific knowledge, supporting my fourth hypothesis that developing vaccines against H2, H7 and
/or H9 is not a profoundly difficult scientific problem.
Hypothesis 5: Developing vaccines against H2, H7 and /or H9 is uneconomic
for vaccine developers under current conditions
Yet another possibility to explain the dearth of vaccines against H2, H7 and H9 is that manufacturers lack
the proper economic incentives to invest in vaccines. Given the uncertainty surrounding the timing,
severity and strain of the next pandemic; the time of manufacture vaccine; and the public acceptance of
vaccines, this seems a logical explanation. The market for pandemic influenza vaccines is complex and,
as in any market with uncertain demand, market failure remains a distinct possibility.
Barring future financial incentives from BARDA, DARPA, PATH or another entity, interviewees view the
further development of vaccines for strains of pandemic potential as unlikely.
Many companies will continue to experiment with seed strains, but actual development of candidate
vaccines will continue to languish in the current funding environment.
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This clearly supports my fifth hypothesis that developing vaccines against H2, H7 and /or H9 is
uneconomic for vaccine developers under current conditions.
Hypothesis 6: A new financial incentive mechanism will induce investment in
and development of H2, H7 and H9 influenza vaccines
Financial incentives
As mentioned earlier, interviewees in general are positive about the current incentives for pandemic
preparedness that are illustrated in Table 1. However, they view these incentives, which are almost
exclusively "push" mechanisms (the one "pull" mechanism noted is for strains of H5) as insufficient to
create the desired investment in vaccines against neglected, high risk pandemic influenza strains.
There is also a need for top-line, revenue support, executives said. "If look at simple things like NPV [net
present value] calculations, commercial forecasts, any kind you make for pandemic is going to be wrong.
It is completely unpredictable when a pandemic will occur and how big it will be. In terms of business
decisions, in terms of a business case, pandemic will always be at the end of the line-so you need some
financial support," one pharma executive noted.
Interviewees from vaccine developers proposed several ways in which governments or non-profits like
PATH could financially support pandemic influenza preparedness efforts.
Pharma companies with pandemic influenza programs benefit from built up manufacturing capacity and
regulatory known-how, and viewed themselves as best equipped to benefit from the programs to
address neglected, high risk pandemic influenza strains.
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However, smaller biotechs also suggested some programs and indicated a willingness to participate
when their manufacturing capacity and in-house knowledge made feasible. One interviewee from a
biotech expressed a "need to focus" on flagship programs. Like H5 has for some biotechs, however,
other neglected, high risk strain could be elevated in importance with the right government incentive.
Interviewees' proposals are all for "pull" mechanisms, and include:
Developing pandemic capacity reservation systems. Multiple companies have used these in the past or
are currently exploring them with partner governments, particularly in Europe where many countries
lack dedicated influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity.
Government subscriptions for pandemic capacity can help to subsidize the cost of maintaining personnel
and infrastructure that might not be needed for normal seasonal production; this is known as
maintenance of a "warm base."
According to interviewees, the concept of pandemic capacity reservation systems-also known as
advance purchase agreements, or APAs-was developed in 2005. These were directed at a possible
H5N1 pandemic which was of particular concern in 2005. According to interviewees, several EU
countries (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and some Nordic countries) entered into APAs
that paid companies a one-time fee to reserve manufacturing capacity for them that would be triggered
by a declaration of a pandemic. Some of these agreements were structured as call options, and at the
time of an H5N1 pandemic, countries could "call" their option to have priority manufacturing capacity
and pay the vaccine manufacturer to produce vaccine for them.
40
Importantly, one executive reports that the current renewals of such APAs may have two fundamental
differences: 1) they will not be restricted to H5 and so could require companies to be prepared for the
other strains that could have pandemic potential, such as H2, H7 and H9; and 2) they should pay the
companies a reservation fee annually for maintaining pandemic preparedness.
"A few countries are moving in this direction but others will need to follow in order to create the
necessary incentives," the executive stated.
Specific government request such as an APA agreement that provides annual funding for being
pandemic ready and reserving capacity for the government that pays the annual fees could provide the
"pull" needed for investment in vaccines for neglected, high risk strains. Companies with existing
manufacturing capacity and regulatory known-how (primarily pharma) suggested this incentive and
viewed themselves as best equipped to benefit from it.
Priming a population against strains of known pandemic potential. This is an approach that multiple
companies mentioned could be financially attractive and is something they have considered internally,
but they see it as less feasible in the current environment of funding and public vaccine acceptance.
The benefit of vaccination with a strain prior to a pandemic could be considerable if a strain does
circulate at a later date. Doing so would prime the immunized population, giving them immune system
exposure. Later, if the strain were to circulate, immunized individuals might only need one, not two
doses to gain immune protection, particularly if the priming vaccine included an adjuvant. Priming could
also potentially reduce the severity of disease upon exposure.
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Priming could entail multiple forms, such as including a potential pandemic strain every year in the
seasonal formulation; developing a vaccine that is a cocktail of antigens, not unlike the annual seasonal
vaccine that combines multiple strains of influenza; and developing single antigen pre-pandemic
vaccines (Klaus Stohr 2010).
Again, companies with existing manufacturing capacity and regulatory known-how (primarily pharma)
suggested this incentive and viewed themselves as best equipped to benefit from it.
Creating national antigen stockpiles with a variety of influenza strains. Currently, the US stockpile that
BARDA funds includes multiple strains of H5 but none of other influenza types. Interviewees suggested
that, with funding, BARDA (or other governments) could expand this program to include other strains of
known pandemic potential.
These stockpiled antigens will likely not be strain-matched perfectly with whatever strain may circulate
in the future. However, a government could use the best matched strain to vaccine during the first wave
of a pandemic, when manufacturing of strain-matched vaccine is ramping up.
Both pharma and biotech influenza vaccine developers viewed themselves as appropriate for this
incentive. The recurring costs (to the government, otherwise known as revenue to the vaccine
developer) were viewed as attractive.
Creating national adjuvant stockpiles. Similarly, interviewees noted that adjuvants will very likely be
needed to render manufactured pandemic influenza vaccines immunogenic, and stockpiling adjuvants
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to ensure sufficient national supplies thus makes a lot of sense. Through BARDA, the US government is
currently doing this, and other governments could as well.
The stockpiled adjuvant could be used in combination with stockpiled antigen to broaden the immune
response of the pandemic influenza vaccinations.
Though potentially financially attractive, interviewees noted that this approach is fraught with
regulatory issues. Two important ones include: 1) Shelf-life of the bulk antigens and adjuvants; and 2)
Compatibility of the adjuvant and the various stockpiled antigens.
Regulatory hurdles aside, both pharma and biotech influenza vaccine developers viewed themselves as
appropriate for this incentive.
Other types of incentives
This thesis initially sought to focus only on the financial incentives that companies require to increase
investment in pandemic influenza efforts. However, it was clear from all interviewees that financial
incentives alone are necessary but not sufficient to change the existing industry dynamic. The chief non-
directly financial concerns cited by representatives from industry relate to:
1) Seasonal influenza
2) Regulatory processes
3) Public awareness and vaccine acceptance
4) Public and private sector goal alignment
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Seasonal influenza
Among interviewees, there was near universal recognition of the important of seasonal influenza
programs to the health of pandemic influenza preparedness. It is a complementary product line that
provides a cross-subsidy to pandemic influenza.
One interviewee put it succinctly: "Seasonal is a business, and pandemic is a public health emergency."
The benefits of strong seasonal influenza programs are two-fold, according to interviewees:
1) Maintenance of a "warm base" of production capacity, skilled personnel and regulatory
infrastructure. Interviewees noted that these attributes are often underappreciated by
countries that seek to build pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing capabilities but lack the
seasonal influenza vaccination rates to support utilization of the plant. A "warm base" allows
manufacturers to rapidly switch from seasonal to pandemic vaccine production when necessary;
interviewees said that lacking the seasonal component can negate the benefit of local pandemic
manufacturing capacity.
2) Regular, recurring revenues to influenza manufacturers. This benefit is seen as tenuous, many
interviewees noted, since historical capacity fluctuations have led to marked changes in the
economics of the seasonal business in the US. Some interviewees noted that they thought the
US was entering another phase of overcapacity in seasonal influenza and noted that, in the
recent past, manufacturers have exited the seasonal business because they could not achieve a
sufficient return on investment. Interviewees noted that sufficient pricing and volume (through
seasonal vaccination rates) is important to the health of the seasonal influenza businesses at
their companies.
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Regulatory processes
Interviewees were quick to laud the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for its work with Medical
Countermeasures (MCMs) initiative that President Obama announced in his 2010 State of the Union
address. To help the nation better respond to bioterrorism and infectious disease threats, the FDA
developed an action plan based on a three part strategy (FDA n.d.):
1) Review process. The FDA seeks to enhance the review process for MCMs by establishing teams
to ensure consistent and efficient regulatory approaches.
2) Regulatory science. To support MCM development and evaluation, the FDA will explore
solutions to complex scientific regulatory problems and identify situations in which the
application of new science could simplify or speed product development and/or the regulatory
process.
3) Legal, regulatory, and policy framework. The FDA will assure that laws and policies support
preparedness and response, and will work with partner agencies to develop new approaches
where changes are needed.
Despite strides made by the FDA with its MCM initiative, however, there was still a near-universal view
among interviewees that regulatory processes for pandemic influenza have significant opportunity for
improvement. Interviewees had many suggestions for regulatory reform, including:
Introduction of mock dossiers in the US. The mock-up procedure allows a vaccine to be developed and
authorized in advance of a pandemic, based on clinical studies generated with a virus strain that could
potentially cause a pandemic. Once the actual virus strain causing a pandemic is identified, the
manufacturer can include this strain in the mock-up vaccine and apply for it to be authorized as a final
pandemic vaccine (EMA 2012).
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This is a feature of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) approval process that many interviewees
mentioned would facilitate pandemic influenza vaccine licensure in the US if it was brought here.
Were a manufacturer to follow this procedure, a small immunogenicity study might be the only
additional step needed upon pandemic declaration before licensure and marketing of the vaccine.
By contrast, in the US, interviewees expressed frustration with the regulatory processes for pandemic
influenza vaccine approval. This has led to the development of influenza vaccines in Europe but not the
US, such as Novartis' Aflunov for pre-pandemic H5N1b.
Non-emergency approval processes for pandemic influenza vaccines. In particular, interviewees were
concerned about licensure of pandemic influenza vaccines for strains that are not part of the annual
seasonal vaccine, which currently includes influenza A(H1N1) and A(H3N2) subtypes and influenza B
subtypes.
Were another strain to emerge with pandemic potential, manufacturers would have two options for
approval of a vaccine: licensure as a new vaccine under current FDA rules; or emergency access granted
by HHS under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. Many interviewees
expressed a desire for a sufficiently fast, non-emergency path to approval.
In addition, companies that do not currently have approved seasonal influenza vaccines currently would
have to apply for licensure as a new vaccine or appeal to HHS to manufacture vaccine for an HINI or
b worked on pre-launch activities for this vaccine
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H3N2 pandemic. Interviewees from these companies noted that the PREP act procedure may work, but
was not as efficient as the European process for mockups.
FDA/EMA regulatory harmonization. Many interviewees also noted that harmonizing regulatory
processes in the US, Europe and other markets could facilitate broader access to pandemic influenza
vaccines, particularly in the event of a pandemic.
The mock-up procedure in Europe was very popular with interviewees, as was the relatively easy
process for filing for annual strain change updates to the seasonal influenza vaccine in the US.
One idea an interviewee offered was for a hybrid EU/US approach, whereby mockup vaccine candidates
would be licensed and their dossiers updated annually to reflect any strain changes. In this way, the
mockup would be treated similarly to the annual strain change for the seasonal influenza vaccine, and
strain changes that happened over time would carry through to the product.
Clarification of criteria for licensure of new technologies. This is an area lacking clarity from regulatory
authorities currently, and is a great source of uncertainty for companies developing new technologies
and for big companies looking to acquire them. Interviewees developing recombinant influenza vaccines
in particular expressed significant concern that the approval process for their technologies is not yet
clarified.
Current regulatory requirements for an efficacy study create what interviewees dubbed a "Catch-22".
The requirement for an efficacy study at the time of a pandemic by definition sets them up to fail,
interviewees from vaccine developers said. If a pandemic influenza vaccine is studied versus a placebo
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or other control in clinical trials, then the vaccine may be approved but people will likely face
unnecessary morbidity and mortality. Or, if vaccine developer studies the vaccine versus a known
efficacious alternative (this could include another vaccine in development if available or a broad
spectrum antiviral), it will be difficult to show a statistical efficacy improvement, and the new vaccine
will fail its clinical trial.
Regulatory acceptance and consensus on next generation assay technologies. In addition, many
interviewees noted that there is a need to develop next-generation assay technologies that can both
speed up vaccine manufacturing technology with current technologies and also be capable of measuring
immunogenicity of vaccine produced using new technology platforms.
All interviewees commenting on this issue said they remain unclear on what the regulatory acceptance
of these assays will be.
Until current assay technology is phased out, development of reagents for strains of pandemic
potential. Interviewees noted that until next generation assays are developed, strain-matched reagents
will still be needed to test the immunogenicity of candidate vaccines. Currently, reagents are available
for some but not all strains of pandemic potential, and interviewees said that this is a rate-limiting step
for companies that seek to develop vaccine candidates for strains of pandemic potential, as they are
reliant on the WHO in this regard.
Interviewees noted that additional reagents for other strains of pandemic potential to the WHO's
repertoire need not be updated as regularly as seasonal strains. Particularly if a virus of pandemic
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potential does not mutate while circulating, then a reagent could remain viable and would not require
regular updating.
Public awareness and vaccine acceptance
There is a sense among many interviewees that the US general public does not sufficiently appreciate
the public health value of seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines, and this is reflected in the annual
seasonal influenza vaccination rates, which remain less than 50% for the general population despite an
HHS target of 80% for persons 6 months-64 years and 90% for adults >65 years and adults 18-64 years
with high-risk conditions (CDC n.d.).
Public willingness to receive vaccines is essential to any pandemic influenza public health effort, and the
need for media and public awareness ranks high on interviewees' lists of concerns.
According to one executive, "The public understanding of severity of the flu; misperceptions about the
safety and efficacy of the vaccine; the fact that many adults don't view vaccination as part of their life -
view it as something you do to children-all of these are issues for influenza manufacturers."
In addition, since adjuvants may be needed at the time of a pandemic, public concerns around these will
also need to be addressed. Concerns about adjuvants safety and adverse effects could be addressed
with additional clinical trials, post marketing surveillance, and patient education. However, many
interviewees noted that "vaccine phobia," sparked in part by retracted research linking vaccines to
autism (CNN 2011), remains a serious concern for industry.
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Private-public sector goal alignment
Lastly, some interviewees noted that given the interdependent nature of industry and government in
combatting pandemic influenza, there remains a need to ensure that public and private sector goals are
aligned.
A BARDA interviewee clearly expressed an understanding of this need, saying: "We will help you
[vaccine companies] with your seasonal vaccine business. But you have to help us on pandemic
preparedness. It is two groups working together for the public good: more and better seasonal vaccine
in the short term, and longer term, pandemic preparedness."
Most interviewees from companies lauded BARDA and its role in creating financial conditions that help
private companies invest in public-private goals. As one interviewee from industry noted, "BARDA is a
great example of a public private government partnership. Without this funding, it would not be a viable
business opportunity. It would not make financial sense for organizations to take that up."
Other interviewees from industry noted that BARDA is working in a rapidly changing industry as new
technologies are developed, and that they see a need to clarify what the agency's long term goals are
and to align these with the goals of companies.
One executive asked: "In the US, what challenge are we trying to solve? It is supply? [This] may have
been addressed. Is it speed? This is going to require new technology. How can this be expedited?"
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Interviewees from industry also noted that the government would be the main purchaser of new
technologies, and until there is greater clarity on governments' willingness to pay for next-generation
technologies, that uncertainty deters further private investment in these technologies.
"If there were some clarity that people would be willing to pay for a product with certain characteristics;
that they'll shift from older technologies to newer," claimed one interviewee.
Some interviewees cited the US government's appreciation of the importance of indemnifying vaccine
manufacturers as a positive example of public-private sector goal alignment. Under the PREP Act, the US
government indemnifies the manufacturers. If there is an untoward side effect profile that no one
anticipated during a pandemic, the US government will carry the risk.
Interviewees noted that the US government appreciated this risk during the H1N1 pandemic, and had
the NIH run some of the riskier clinical trials on special populations like pregnant women. However,
interviewees also noted the risk that not all governments will always accept the notion that vaccine
manufacturers require indemnification to deliver pandemic influenza vaccine. "They have short
memories," one executive said, "and do not have an understanding of all the risks that could bring a
company down."
Given the finding that financial incentives alone are necessary but not sufficient to induce investment in
H2, H7 and H9 vaccines, there is evidence to conditionally reject my sixth hypothesis that new financial
incentive mechanisms will induce investment in and development of H2, H7 and H9 influenza vaccines,
with the caveat that financial incentives plus other factors (regulatory, seasonal influenza, public
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acceptance and public private goals) are needed to change the current pandemic influenza vaccine
development paradigm.
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Chapter 5: Impact
In the past, when incentive mechanisms for development of treatments for neglected diseases were
designed, the policymakers did not speak to the people and organizations intended to be incented. In
this thesis, I have not only laid out possible mechanisms for pandemic influenza vaccines as proposed by
the intended targets of such incentives, but also a broader framework to support them (please see
Figure 7 below):
Figure 7: Incentives Framework for Pandemic Influenza Vaccines
Financial Regulatory
Pubic-private
goals
Seasonal Pubic
influenza acceptance
This framework is important for a simple reason: the US, and the world, is not ready for the next
influenza pandemic, and despite significant efforts and resources expended to improve preparedness,
there is still more to be done.
The laudable efforts by BARDA, DARPA, NIAID and PATH, with a few exceptions, have not focused on
developing vaccines for the H2, H7 and H9 strains that are known to be of pandemic potential.
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Areas for future research
This thesis could serve as the basis for additional research in a number of areas. Ideally, it can be used to
encourage research to better understand the unique challenges facing programs targeting pandemic
influenza and biodefense threats, as well as other pandemic threats such as dengue.
At BARDA, one former employee told me that influenza was considered a success story on which to
model other programs. She noted that other threats (i.e. biological, radiological, chemical) did not have
the seasonal component help establish them as businesses with regular, recurring revenues, and, as a
result, there were also not companies presently working in the space with which to partner.
Future research could explore whether lessons from pandemic influenza (e.g. that a seasonal influenza
program creates a complementary business line that cross subsidizes the public health emergency
efforts in pandemic influenza) are applicable to understanding other biodefense threats, and whether
the incentives framework laid out here has broader applicability to these threats.
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Chapter 6: Policy recommendations
Three policy recommendations arise from this work:
1) Increase funding for pandemic preparedness to support programs tailored to neglected high risk
influenza strains such as H2, H7 and H9
In 2011, GSK had sales of 248M GBP, approximately 400M USD, across its influenza brands
(Annual Report 2011). Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics had net sales of nearly 2B USD and
core operating income of 135M USD across all brands including influenza in 2011 (Annual Report
2011).
In the context of these financial figures, it stands to reason that additional pandemic
preparedness funding in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually would be meaningful to the
bottom line of influenza vaccine developers. If this took the form of the "pull" mechanisms
described in the Chapter 4 section on financial incentives, it would incent the desired
investment in vaccines for neglected, high risk strains.
In light of predicted BARDA funding shortfalls for technology development (Matheny, Mair and
Smith 2008), economic austerity in the euro zone, and the lack of a perceived imminent threat
in pandemic influenza, however, this additional funding may languish in the absence of strong
political leadership.
2) Harmonize EU and US influenza vaccine regulatory regimes to reduce dis-incentives to pandemic
influenza vaccine investment
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Back in 2004 at a WHO meeting for pandemic influenza vaccines, one of the conclusions was
that "coordination at the regulatory level is needed to improve the regulatory environment and
facilitate international marketing of vaccines (WHO 2004)."
As of yet, the FDA and EMA still have important difference in their regulatory processes that
were reviewed earlier in Chapter 4. The US has not yet introduced "mock-up" pandemic
vaccines as was encouraged in the WHO 2004 meeting (WHO 2004): "All manufacturers should
develop internal contingency plans to expedite the switch from production of seasonal vaccines
to pandemic vaccines. Such plans should include the testing of "mock-up" pandemic-like
vaccines according to established regulatory procedures."
Though harmonization has not been achieved in the past eight years, US and EU authorities
should work together to forge a consensus on pandemic influenza vaccine regulatory
requirements. Doing so would reduce the cost of developing pandemic influenza vaccines and
could help increase global access to them (WHO 2004) (Gronvall and Borio 2006).
3) Promote public awareness of the importance of influenza vaccination to support uptake of the
seasonal influenza vaccine and, when necessary, pandemic influenza vaccine as well
This is difficult in light of the barriers to vaccination individuals face-among them fear of
needles, convenience, costs, concern about side effects from social media and now-refuted
autism scares. Public awareness campaigns about the importance of influenza vaccination,
subsidies for seasonal influenza vaccines and accessible vaccination facilities all could help
improve the seasonal vaccination rates so they get closer to the CDC's Health People 2020 goals.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This work has produced the following key observations:
1) There is a dearth of vaccines against influenza strains of known pandemic potential such as H2,
H7 and H9
2) Current pandemic preparedness efforts are not focused on these strains
3) Funding for pandemic preparedness efforts in H2, H7 and H9 would help incentivize
development of vaccines against these strains
4) Support for seasonal influenza, regulatory changes, alignment of public and private sector goals,
and increased vaccine acceptance are also required
In a world of limited public health and biodefense funding, it is not illogical that BARDA, DARPA, NIAID
and PATH have focused on the higher priority H1 and H5 strains of influenza. They have also done
important work to ensure the health of the domestic seasonal influenza business and made
considerable progress in diversifying away from egg-based influenza vaccine production and into cell-
based and possibly recombinant technologies. The stockpiles of H5 antigen and various adjuvants that
BARDA has funded could also prove to be tremendous value in the event a strain of an H5 with human-
to-human transmission capabilities emerges and a pandemic strikes.
This is not enough. The suggestions that the interviewees from industry proffered should be seriously
considered to support the health of the industry and protection of the population from the next
influenza pandemic.
Stockpiles of influenza antigen, the key ingredient in vaccine that provokes an immune response, and
adjuvant, which would likely be needed with pandemic influenza and increases the immune response,
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against the latest circulating strains could save lives; regulatory mockups for pandemic influenza
vaccines could speed approval; and building familiarity and comfort with manufacturing techniques for
these strains can aid in a time of immense strain. Even in an age when we do not yet have universal
vaccines that can provide broad protection against many strains of influenza, there are steps we can
take to protect against pandemic strains.
Pandemic and biodefense threats are a unique challenge to the traditional public health framework, in
which resources are commonly allocated according to the probability of an event and its possible
impact. This mentality may be effective for cancer or HIV but is wrong for pandemic influenza.
The consequences of the latter are staggering, even though the probabilities of such events are difficult
or impossible to estimate. They are the black swans, the low probability but high impact events that can
change history, of public health.
Addressing them requires not only the financial incentives for therapeutic development but also an
integrated framework of incentives that:
1) maintains a recurring revenue stream and skilled workforce
2) supports the approval and regulation of therapeutics for diseases that are rare and create
challenging clinical trial settings
3) facilitates public acceptance of therapeutics not studied in randomized controlled trials
4) aligns public and private sector goals so that the right treatments for important threats are
developed according to agreed criteria
Following this framework is a key step towards protecting the public from not only pandemic influenza,
but also the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) accidents, incidents and attacks, and
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emerging infectious diseases that it is BARDA's mission to develop and procure medical
countermeasures against.
A comment on H3N2v
At the time of this thesis submission (September 4, 2012), a variant of H3N2 had been recently found
responsible for limited person to person transmission. Since July, this strain has sickened almost 300
individuals across ten US states (CDC n.d.) and at the end of August led to its first death (McNeil Jr.
2012).
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Appendix
Influenza vaccines portfolios
Figure 8: Influenza Vaccines Portfolio - Abbott (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D Insight 2012)
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Figure 9: Influenza Vaccines Portfolio - GlaxoSmithKline (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D
Insight 2012)
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Figure 10: Influenza Vaccines Portfolio - Merck (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D Insight
2012)
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Figure 11: Influenza Vaccines Portfolio - Novartis (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D Insight
2012)
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Figure 12: Influenza Vaccines Portfolio - Sanofi Pasteur (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D
Insight 2012)
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Influenza vaccines in development: HiN1
Table 3: Influenza Vaccines In Development: H1N1 (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D Insight
2012)
Drug Phase Originator Other
Organizations
Influenza A virus
H1N1 vaccine - CEL-
SCI
Discontinued/Suspended/No
development reported
CEL-SCI Corporation Johns Hopkins
University
(Collaborator)
SKF 106160 Discontinued/Suspended/No GlaxoSmithKline
development reported
Research program: Preclinical AlphaVax
pandemic influenza
virus vaccines -
AlphaVax
Research program: Preclinical Antigen Express Generex
li-Key peptide Biotechnology
hybrid vaccines - Corporation
Antigen Express (Owner), Mayo
Clinic
(Collaborator),
Pevion Biotech
_________________(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical BioAlliance Pharma
influenza A H1N1
vaccine -
BioAlliance Pharma
CR 6261 Preclinical Crucell Janssen
Pharmaceuticals
(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical Etubics Corporation
influenza A HIN1
vaccine - Etubics
Research program: Preclinical ImmuneRegen BioCure
substance P BioSciences (Collaborator),
derivative - GenPhar
ImmuneRegen (Collaborator),
Hyperion
Biotechnology
(Collaborator),
Lovelace
Respiratory
Research Institute
(Collaborator),
National Cancer
Institute (USA)
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(Collaborator),
Radboud-
University-
Nijmegen-Medical-
Centre
(Collaborator),
Scancell
(Technology
Provider),
Translational
Genomics Research
Institute
(Collaborator),
ULURU
(Collaborator),
University of
Rochester
(Collaborator),
Virion Systems
(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical Inovio Biomedical Public Health
influenza DNA Corporation, VGX Agency of Canada
vaccines - Inovio International (Collaborator),
University of
Pennsylvania
(Collaborator),
Vaccine Research
Center
(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical Inviragen
influenza A virus
H1N1 vaccine -
Inviragen
Research program: Preclinical Variation
viral vaccines - Biotechnologies
Variation
Biotechnologies
Research program: Preclinical Vaxart
H1N1 influenza
virus vaccine -
Vaxart
Research program: Preclinical VaxInnate 3M Drug Delivery
infectious disease Systems
vaccines - (Technology
Vaxlnnate Provider)
Influenza A virus Phase I Antigen Express Generex
H1N1 vaccine - Biotechnology
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Antigen Express Corporation
(Owner)
Influenza virus Phase I Dynavax Novartis
vaccine - Dynavax Technologies (Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Phase I GlaxoSmithKline Intercell
H5N1 cell culture (Collaborator)
based vaccine -
GlaxoSmithKline
Influenza A virus Phase I iBio Inc Fraunhofer USA
H1N1 vaccine - Center for
iBio/Fraunhofer Molecular
USA Center for Biotechnology
Molecular (Collaborator)
Biotechnology
Influenza A virus Phase I Medicago
vaccine H1N1 -
Medicago
VRC-FLUDNA057- Phase I National Institute
00-VP of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases,
Vaccine Research
Center
INO 3510 Phase I University of Inovio
Pennsylvania Pharmaceuticals
(Technology
Provider)
HIN1 influenza Phase I Vaxine Protein Sciences
virus vaccine - Corporation
Vaxine (Collaborator)
VAX 128 Phase I Vaxinnate
Influenza virus DNA Phase I Vical
vaccine - Vical
Influenza virus Phase 11 Green Hills
delta NS1 vaccine Biotechnology
Influenza virus-like Phase II Novavax
particle vaccine
(trivalent) -
Novavax
Attenuated Phase Il Serum Institute of
influenza A virus India
H1N1 vaccine -
Serum Institute of
India
Inactivated Phase 11 Serum Institute of
influenza A virus India
HIN1 vaccine -
Serum Institute of
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India
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Baxter
H1N1 vaccine - International
Baxter
International
Influenza A H1N1 Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Bharat Biotech
vaccine - Bharat
Biotech
Pandemic influenza Marketed/Registered/Preregistration BioDiem, Nobilon Centers for Disease
virus vaccine - International Control and
BioDiem Prevention
(Collaborator),
Institute of
Experimental
Medicine of the
Russian Academy of
Medical Sciences
(Collaborator),
Serum Institute of
India (Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration CSL National Institute
H1N1 vaccine (CSL of Allergy and
425) - CSL Infectious Diseases
Biotherapies (Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration GlaxoSmithKline
vaccines -
GlaxoSmithKline
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Hard To Treat Zhejiang Tianyuan
H1N1 vaccine - Diseases Bio-pharmaceutical
Hard To Treat (Collaborator)
Diseases
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Hualan Biological
H1N1 vaccine - Engineering
Hualan
MEDI 3414 Marketed/Registered/Preregistration MedImmune,
National Institute
of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases
Pandemic influenza Marketed/Registered/Preregistration National Institute
A virus vaccines - of Allergy and
Novartis/NIAID Infectious Diseases,
Novartis
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Novartis
H1N1 vaccine -
Novartis
Influenza A HIN1 Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Novavax Centers for Disease
vaccine - Novavax Control and
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Prevention
(Collaborator), GE
Healthcare
(Collaborator),
National Institute
of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases
(Collaborator),
Novavax (Owner),
University of
Pittsburgh
(Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Sanofi Pasteur National Institute
H1N1vaccine - of Allergy and
Sanofi Pasteur Infectious Diseases
(Collaborator)
H1N1 pandemic Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Sinovac Biotech
influenza virus
vaccine - Sinovac
Biotech
Influenza vaccines in development: H5N1
Table 4: Influenza Vaccines In Development: H5N1 (Author's analysis) (ADIS R&D Insight
2012)
Drug Phase Originator Other
Organizations
Research program:
influenza
monoclonal
antibodies - Kirin
Pharma
Discontinued/Suspended/No
development reported
Kirin Brewery Kyowa Hakko Kirin
(Owner)
H5N1 influenza A Discontinued/Suspended/No National Institute of Protein Sciences
virus vaccine - development reported Allergy and Corporation
Protein Sciences Infectious Diseases (Collaborator)
Research program: Discontinued/Suspended/No PowderMed
H5N1 avian development reported
influenza virus
vaccine -
PowderMed
Influenza A virus Discontinued/Suspended/No Solvay
H5N1 vaccine - development reported Pharmaceuticals
Solvay
Research program: Preclinical AlphaVax
pandemic influenza
virus vaccines -
AlphaVax
Research program: Preclinical AmVac
influenza A virus
H5N1 vaccines -
AmVac
Research program: Preclinical CEL-SCI Corporation National Institute
CEL 1000 - CEL-SCI of Allergy and
Infectious
Diseases
(Collaborator),
Naval Medical
Research Center
(Collaborator),
Northeastern
Ohio Universities
College of
Medicine
(Collaborator),
Proxima Concepts
(Technology
Provider), United
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States Army
Medical Research
Institute of
Infectious
Diseases
(Collaborator),
University of
Nebraska Medical
Center
(Collaborator)
CR 6261 Preclinical Crucell Janssen
Pharmaceuticals
(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical Crucell Janssen
influenza Pharmaceuticals
monoclonal (Collaborator)
antibodies - Crucell
Research program: Preclinical CytoGenix United States
DNA vaccines - Army Medical
CytoGenix Research Institute
of Infectious
Diseases
(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical EPIC BIO
influenza antibodies
and vaccines - EPIC
BIO
Research program: Preclinical Inovio Biomedical Public Health
influenza DNA Corporation, VGX Agency of Canada
vaccines - Inovio International (Collaborator),
University of
Pennsylvania
(Collaborator),
Vaccine Research
Center
(Collaborator)
Research program: Preclinical InViragen LLC,
H5N1 avian University of
influenza vaccine - Wisconsin-Madison
Inviragen/University
of Wisconsin
Research program: Preclinical MediVas-LLC
influenza virus
vaccine - MediVas
Research program: Preclinical Sanofi Pasteur
influenza virus strain
H5N1 clade 2
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vaccine - Sanofi
Pasteur
Research program: Preclinical Tetragenetics National Institute
infectious disease of Allergy and
vaccines - Infectious
Tetragenetics Diseases (Funder)
Research program: Preclinical Variation
viral vaccines - Biotechnologies
Variation
Biotechnologies
Research program: Preclinical VaxInnate 3M Drug Delivery
infectious disease Systems
vaccines - Vaxlnnate (Technology
Provider)
Influenza A virus Phase I Antigen Express University of
H5N1 vaccine - Rochester
Antigen Express (Collaborator)
Intranasal influenza Phase I Archimedes Pharma
A virus H5N1
vaccine -
Archimedes Pharma
H5N1 influenza virus Phase I DelSite Nanotherapeutics
vaccine intranasal - Biotechnologies (Owner)
Nanotherapeutics
Influenza A virus Phase I GlaxoSmithKline Intercell
H5N1 cell culture (Collaborator)
based vaccine -
GlaxoSmithKline
Influenza A virus Phase I Green Cross Mogam
vaccine H5N1 - Biotechnology
Green Cross/Mogam Research Institute
Biotechnology (Collaborator)
Institute
Influenza A virus Phase I INB:Biotechnologies Fraunhofer USA
vaccine H5N1 - iBio Center for
Molecular
Biotechnology
(Collaborator),
iBio Inc (Owner)
H5N1 avian Phase I MedImmune
influenza vaccine Vaccines, National
intranasal - Institute of Allergy
Medlmmune/NIAID and Infectious
Diseases
H5N1 influenza virus Phase I Novavax Centers for
vaccine - Novavax Disease Control
and Prevention
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(Collaborator),
Southern
Research Institute
(Collaborator),
University of Hong
Kong
(Collaborator),
University of
Pittsburgh
(Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Phase I PaxVax Purdue Research
vaccine H5N1 - Foundation
PaxVax (Technology
Provider)
INO 3510 Phase I University of Inovio
Pennsylvania Pharmaceuticals
(Technology
Provider)
VGX 3400 Phase I University of
Pennsylvania
H5N1 influenza virus Phase I Vaxart
vaccine - Vaxart
Influenza virus DNA Phase I Vical
vaccine - Vical
Influenza virus delta Phase 11 Green Hills
NS1 vaccine Biotechnology
Influenza A virus Phase || Medicago Infectious Disease
H5N1 vaccine - Research Institute
Medicago (Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Phase Il Protein Sciences
H5N1 vaccine - Corporation
Protein Sciences
Corporation
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Baxter International DynPort Vaccine
H5N1 vaccines - Company
Baxter International (Collaborator),
National Institute
of Allergy and
Infectious
Diseases
(Collaborator), US
Department of
Health and
Human Services
(Collaborator)
Pandemic influenza Marketed/Registered/Preregistration BioDiem, Nobilon Centers for
virus vaccine - International Disease Control
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and Prevention
(Collaborator),
Institute of
Experimental
Medicine of the
Russian Academy
of Medical
Sciences
(Collaborator),
Serum Institute of
India
(Collaborator)
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration CSL
H5N1 vaccine - CSL
H5N1 (pre- Marketed/Registered/Preregistration GlaxoSmithKline
)pandemic influenza
virus vaccine -
GlaxoSmithKline
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration GlaxoSmithKline
vaccines -
GlaxoSmithKline
H5N1 whole virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration ID Biomedical GlaxoSmithKline
influenza vaccine Corporation (Owner)
(Daronrix) -
GlaxoSmithKline
Pandemic influenza Marketed/Registered/Preregistration National Institute of
A virus vaccines - Allergy and
Novartis/NIAID Infectious Diseases,
Novartis
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Novartis, Novartis
H5N1 vaccine - Vaccines
Novartis
Influenza A H1N1 Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Novavax Centers for
vaccine - Novavax Disease Control
and Prevention
(Collaborator), GE
Healthcare
(Collaborator),
National Institute
of Allergy and
Infectious
Diseases
(Collaborator),
Novavax (Owner),
University of
Pittsburgh
(Collaborator)
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BioDiem
Influenza A virus Marketed/Registered/Preregistration Sinovac Biotech
H5N1 vaccine -
Sinovac Biotech
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